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History of Design: Pre-Industrial Revolution
• Classic Cathedral Design and Construction representative of 
the complexity of the era
• Design and construction managed by Master Mason
– All Knowing
• Knew and could practice all the design and construction skills 
necessary to produce the magnificent cathedrals     
– Understood the physics associated with the cathedral 
design
• Life long endeavor  
• Trained / apprenticed his replacement
• Tools, Processes, Skills acquired through experience
– Processes alone could not substitute for experience
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History of Design: Post-Industrial Revolution
• The complexity system designs increased and became too 
much for one person to know
• Systems engineering developed in an attempt to manage 
these complex designs
– “…the initial formalization of the systems engineering process 
for military development began to surface in the mid-1950’s on 
the ballistic missile programs.” (SP6102 Readings in Systems 
Engineering, 1993, p.9)
– Later evolution included the development of Integrated Product 
Teams, Product Development Teams, etc
– Group becomes “all knowing”: Collectively contains the 
knowledge, skills and experience to produce products
– Biggest challenge for SE is to make sure that the “Group 
Communication System” functions otherwise “all knowing” of 
the team fails
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Systems Engineering: What Is It?
• From SP-6102
– “Systems engineering is the management function which 
controls the total system development effort for the purpose of 
achieving an optimum balance of all system elements. It is a 
process which transforms an operational need into a 
description of system parameters and integrates those 
parameters to optimize the overall system effectiveness.”
• Purpose of SE then is to create a complex product that 
meets all requirements through a methodology that focuses 
on an integrated design that emphasizes balancing risk 
between all subsystems and components
– The effect should be an optimized system but made up of sub-
optimized subsystems and components
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Systems Engineering Functions
• SE Functions can be grouped into three categories
– Classical Systems Engineering focused on processes, 
procedures, configuration and data management control, etc
– Project control focused on cost and schedule 
– Technical Integration focused on the interactions among all the 
compartmentalized hardware design and discipline areas , ,    
reintegrating them into a verifiable and operable system that 
meets requirements in a balanced state. 
• Master Mason was responsible for all three      
• Today, there is a tendency to focus only on the first two 
assuming that the processes and procedures can 
compensate for lack of experience training and the complex    ,     
interactions between subsystems / components
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Systems Engineering: Why We Ignore Technical 
Integration
• Strong tendency to view systems engineering as only the 
processes that bring the designed parts together 
(integration) rather than creating “Integrated Designs”
– It is based on an assumption that the system can be broken 
apart expecting linearity and handle everything by defining 
pertinent requirements, defining and managing interfaces, 
design data flow and then designing the parts (Classical SE).
• Then when the system is put back together it will perform ok. 
• It is a false assumption because there are many interactions, 
linear and nonlinear,  in a complex “system” causing the 
parts to perform different together than apart.
– It also assumes design development is serial and not iterative 
in nature
– This approach also tends to neglect the communication needs 
of the “Group Knowledge”
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Systems Engineering: Achieving a Balanced 
Integrated Design
• So, the systems engineer for an integrated design is 
responsible for and concerned with getting all interacting 
disciplines into a balanced state using uncertainties, 
sensitivities, risks, and programmatics (cost and schedule) 
– Part of that task is to also insure that all the discipline models, 
simulations, technology base, etc are at the appropriate 
maturity level so that an accurate trade space can be 
determined
– Systems engineer does not replace the Master Mason but 
ensures that the necessary communication takes place in the 
SE process along with the necessary skills and tools to utilize 
the “Group Knowledge” in creating a balanced integrated 
d ies gn
– The “Group Knowledge” provides the needed “understanding of 
the physics” associated with the complex system design
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A Balanced Design
• Achieving a balanced design is about “spreading the pain”
• Balance needs to be achieved early in the design process 
usually by the conceptual design review because the impact 
is almost always already set
• Metrics for balanced design
– Risk: cost schedule technical , , 
– Margins
– Uncertainties
S iti iti f d i t– ens v es o  es gn parame er
– Technology maturity level
• If low it is difficult to impossible to quantify the others above
• If balance not achieved programs / projects will experience 
cost overruns, schedule slips or even failure
SSME Weight Stor is a good e ample of hat can go rong if
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the requirements, technology base and final systems design do 
not balance early
Background: Elementary Rocket Science
• To fully appreciate the SSME weight growth story and the lessons 
it teaches us about proper systems engineering we need to 
understand some of the challenges of rocket design
• The vehicle must impart orbital energy to the payload. 
– (Orbital energy is large -- h ~ 160 n.m. altitude,  ΔV ~25,300 ft/s
• With current technology, this pushes propulsion, structures, and 
systems capability to the limit.
• Payload size and mass drives launch vehicle performance 
requirements.
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Background: Elementary Rocket Science
• Propulsion:
– Efficient conversion of chemical potential energy to kinetic energy (The 
Space Shuttle Main Engine has an Isp of 452 s out of a potential 460 s) 
– Vehicle Thrust to weight ratio at liftoff greater than 1.1 
• Structures:
– Efficient/lightweight strong structures. Vehicle mass fraction around .90
• The ratio of the average skin thickness to the diameter of the Shuttle 
External Tank is  a factor of 3 less than that of an aluminum drink can. 
• System Effects:  
– Minimize losses during mission (Understand, quantify, control, and 
manage)
All system elements being pushed to their limits creates a 
f f f
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constant “tug o  war” that, i  not care ully monitored, leads to 
unbalance in the design
Liquid Pump-fed Main Engines
• Pump-fed liquid engines are one of  the most complex and challenging 
subsystems on the entire launch vehicle and present many systems 
engineering challenges
• Pump-fed liquid engine design requires many of the same design functions 
and analysis disciplines that the vehicle design uses
SSME
HP/Wt = 879
• Liquid rocket engines have much higher 
power densities than more conventional 
transportation system engines
SSME Fuel Turbopump
775 lb    
72,000 HP
HP/Wt = 93
• This creates extreme environments and 
stretches the limits of design and analysis 
capabilities
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Difficulty and Complexity of Liquid Rocket 
Engines Are Reflected in Turbomachinery Design
• Turbopumps differ from conventional gas turbine engines in significant ways
Difficult Propellants
Material compatibility 
issues, cavitation, bearing 
t hi h h t fl
Extreme Blade Loading
Up to 550 hp per blade
Item
Typical Pump Fed Rocket Engine Hydrogen 
Turbopump Parameters (range depends on 
engine cycle and application)
Jet Engine
s resses, g  ea  uxes,
heavier flanges, tighter 
complex seals
Fuel Hydrogen Petroleum distillate
Oxidizer Oxygen Air
Operating speed (RPM) 20,000 to 36,000 15,000
Turbine blade tip speed (ft/sec) 1400 to 1850 1850
High Speeds
Bearing life, 
rotordynamics issues 
Turbine power density (HP/in^2) 2000 to 3200 394
Turbine inlet temperature (deg F) 1000 to 1600 2400
Turbine heat transfer coef. 
(BTU/ft^2- hr-degF) 20,000 to 54,000 500
Turbine thermal start/stop transients 1000 t 32 000 100
High Power Density
High power bending 
stress, high work per unit 
area, tight manufacturing
(deg F/sec)  o ,
Pump/compressor pressure rise (psi) 2000 to 7000 400 - 600
Pump dynamic pressure (psi) 500 to 2000 50 - 200
                                 
tolerances
Uncooled Blades High Thermal StrainsHigh Pressures 
Limit inlet temperature, 
increase rotational 
speed and blade 
turning
  
Very high thermal stress, 
low cycle fatigue, 
material limitations
(static and dynamic)
High housing loads, 
instabilities, high-cycle 
fatigue
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SSME Weight Growth History
First Flight
10000
Thrust Requirement up to 550K.
Weight previously scaled from 415K engine.
9000
     
Due to re-evaluation, weight increase is not as large.
Increase in nozzle 
tube walls to meet CEI 
safety factor.
Block I Configuration
Block IIA Configuration
Block II Configuration
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Customer addition of pogo 
i t
Lowering of thrust requirement 
to 470K. Authority to proceed.
Actual weight variance deduction 
due to actual engine weights. 
Return to Flight Configuration
  
7000E
n
g suppress on sys em.
Customer change to heat shield 
increased nozzle structure.
Change in bookkeeping 
philosophy.
6000
Customer addition of nozzle thermal protection.
Customer requirements change.
Machining of excess material.
Stress analysis on primary nozzle resulted in weight increase and subsequent nozzle redesign.
5000
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Date
Challenge and Problem better understood by looking at engine thrust to weight ratio13
SSME Vacuum Thrust to Weight Ratio History
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First Flight
Machining of excess material.
Stress analysis on primary nozzle resulted in weight increase and subsequent nozzle redesign
• Early (1971) thrust to weight ratio predictions for the 
SSME concepts were around 65 to 1
– Based on J-2 and F-1 technology base and some 
advanced development with Air Force
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Customer addition of nozzle thermal protection.
            .
Customer change to heat shield increased nozzle structure.
Increase in nozzle 
    
– Estimate was realistic and representative of 
achievable values
• As the Space Shuttle System design concept 
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tube walls to meet CEI 
safety factor.
Change in bookkeeping 
philosophy. Return to Flight Configuration
matur d, weight became a serious problem driving 
the thrust to weight ratio requirements of the SSME 
to 80 to 1
– The technology base did not support this requirement
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Lowering of thrust requirement 
to 470K.Authority to proceed.
Customer requirements change.
Actual weight variance deduction 
due to actual engine weights. 
Block I Configuration
– Massive development effort required to cut weight out 
of the engine
• All welded construction for most of the components
• No weld lands60
Thrust Requirement up to 550K.
  
Block IIA Configuration
Block II Configuration
Thrust increase from 470k 
to 490k without weight 
increase
  
• Machining off all excess material
– Additional performance enhancements to meet system 
weight problem included trading engine life for 
50
11/24/70 11/23/72 11/23/74 11/22/76 11/22/78 11/21/80 11/21/82 11/20/84 11/20/86 11/19/88 11/19/90 11/18/92 11/18/94 11/17/96 11/17/98 11/16/00
Date
increased power level 
• Increased engine thrust to 109% PL and cut design 
life from 100 to 55 missions
14
SSME Weight Problems
A f i ht t d l l i i• s consequence o  we g  cu s an  power eve  ncrease, eng ne 
began experiencing many fatigue failures some resulting in 
catastrophic engine failures during ground testing
– High cost of hardware losses design changes and schedule slips    ,     
– In 1978, two alternating MSFC engineering teams of about 100 each 
were established at Canoga Park and worked with a large team at 
MSFC for 9 months to address these problems 
– Instituted a fracture control survey of engine and identified many 
problem areas
• Engine originally not designed for fracture control
• Fracture control team established permanently
• Lack of robustness in design lead to increased operations costs to 
assure engine safety and reliability 
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SSME Solutions and Weight Growth
• In late 70’s as Shuttle System design began to solidify, weight was 
offered up to the SSME project manager to fix problems by Shuttle 
program manager
– SSME project manager put off weight increases to support first flight 
date using current engine design with limited life and performance
• Believed that it was better to be flying at lower capability than to wait 
until all capability was available (balancing political concerns)       
– Weight was increased as new redesigned components were added as 
block upgrades beginning in the mid to late 80’s and into the 90’s
• Major examples are Two Duct Hot Gas Manifold Large Throat Main       ,    
Combustion Chamber, ATD High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump, 
ATD High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
• Weight could be added without impacting performance because the 
Orbiter had to fly ballast in the back to offset a heavy nose section
– Increased engine weight just off loaded ballast
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SSME Vacuum Thrust to Weight Ratio History
• Final engine T/W ratio essentially same as originally estimated but 
final design was compromised because unrealistic requirements 
set stage for constrained engine design
90
First Flight
Customer addition of nozzle thermal protection.
Machining of excess material.
Stress analysis on primary nozzle resulted in weight increase and subsequent nozzle redesign.
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Increase in nozzle 
tube walls to meet CEI 
safety factor.
Change in bookkeeping 
philosophy. Return to Flight Configuration
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Actual weight variance deduction 
due to actual engine weights
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Thrust Requirement up to 550K.
Lowering of thrust requirement 
to 470K.Authority to proceed.
    . 
Block I Configuration
Block IIA Configuration
Bl k II C fi ti
Thrust increase from 470k 
to 490k without weight 
increase
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Lesson Learned
• Absolutely critical that someone be responsible for the Integrated 
Vehicle System Design (not just “integrating” pieces together) to 
adequately balance the risks across all elements while decomposing the 
i t d t h l t t ki i t t th irequ remen s own o eac  e emen  a ng n o accoun  e vary ng 
maturity levels of the technology base, the design of each and the 
intricate interactions
– That “someone” is not a master mason but ensures that the “Group            
Knowledge” of the design team provides the same function
• Shuttle system was designed with an immature technology base for 
many of the subsystems
– Made it impossible to adequately balance risk by properly flowing down 
requirements to these subsystems such as the SSME
– Cannot adequately measure risk, uncertainties, sensitivities, cost or 
schedule if technology base is not demonstrated and understood 
– Must fight external pressures to compromise on technical credibility
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Lesson Learned Continued
• Pushing the envelope without margin or a robust design will result in 
increased problems and non-optimum designs at significant cost
– SSME, while a magnificent machine, is not robust
– It took numerous design block changes with increased weight and 
operations costs to reach the current level of maturity that is flying today
• Anticipating unknowns is essential because they will occur during 
development no matter how mature the technology base or the design 
concept
– Minimizing these unknown unknowns is accomplished through diligently 
quantifying sensitivities uncertainties and risks based on all identified ,        
potential failure modes
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